Trade challenges in the era of America First: implications and prospects for PDO and PGI products
By Martina Salerni
Donald Trump's comeback to the presidency of the United States in January 2025 has altered global trade relations, materializing the risk of a break with the economic policies pursued by administrations over the past 20 years and jeopardizing the balance of international markets (Daveri F., ISPI Online, Protezionismo, immigrazione e Cina: i pilastri dell'agenda economica di Trump).
The shift towards a new protectionism has led to a crisis of the non-discrimination and reciprocity principles of the World Trade Organization ( Staiger R., East Asia Forum, How Trump threatens the world trading system).
Due to the adoption of the Executive Order 14257, the U.S. has thus imposed tariff barriers on more than 90 countries, implementing targeted duties even against the European Union and other world economic powers, aiming particularly to penalise those states that do not have “updated trade agreements with the US” (BBC News, Trump’s Tariffs: How businesses around the world responded).
The US President promises an even stricter tariff policy than the one adopted in 2018–2019, in order to develop a reindustrialization process that can protect U.S. workers and industries and revive the economy of traditional sectors, starting from chemical and automotive industries (Ratto F., Il Caffè Geopolitico, Trump e il ritorno del protezionismo: un pericolo per il commercio globale?).
The goal, therefore, is to follow the America First approach, which promotes American economic self-sufficiency by encouraging domestic production and countering industrial relocation of American companies (Daveri F., ISPI Online, Protezionismo, immigrazione e Cina: i pilastri dell'agenda economica di Trump).
Trump’s policies are inevitably having repercussions on the global economy, materializing the risk of a trade war and raising concerns about a significant reduction in global GDP by 2027, with a contraction estimated at around 0.6%. If we also take into account other policies adopted by the White House, such as tax cuts (introduced with the tax reform “One Big Beautiful Bill Act”) and the imposition of tighter immigration controls (provided by the Presidential Proclamation 10949) , the GDP is expected to decline by 1.2% already in 2026 (Tajoli L., Italia R., ISPI Online, Trump: The Tariff Man è tornato).
In this regard, questions are being raised about the effective role of the World Trade Organization (WTO), established in 1994 with the aim of stimulating international trade by reducing trade barriers and settling disputes between member States, as laid down at art. 3 of Marrakesh Agreement, which clarifies the functions of the Organisation. Thus, the WTO “works to guarantee a rules-based international trading system” (European Parliament, Fact Sheets on the European Union, The European Union and the World Trade Organization).
However, Trump’s interests are likely to scuttle a trade system which is already affected: the growing difficulties in managing trade tensions, particularly between the United States and China, made the WTO a matter of debate. This stalemate has worsened with the tendency of member States to arrange bilateral agreements rather than multilateral treaties, which define common rules for trade among WTO member countries (Lepri G., Solomone I., La Voce, Con la crisi del Wto è in gioco il multilateralismo).
Although the U.S. Constitution allows unilateral actions and permits to increase tariffs on imports from specific country or countries, such practices violate one of the founding principles of the WTO, the “most-favoured-nation” principle (World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: principles of the trading system), as outlined in art. I GATT. (Export USA, Dazi USA e Politica Commerciale degli Stati Uniti).
The most-favoured-nation clause establishes the “principle of not discriminating between one’s trading partners” (European Commission, Most favoured nation), meaning that, according to the WTO, “any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by a contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties” (General Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment, art. I GATT).
The U.S. had already violated WTO rules in the past, particularly the ones provided by art. 20 GATT 1994: according to this disposition, it would be possible to impose trade restrictions, if justified. In 2018, specifically, as a result of the decision to impose tariffs on steel and aluminium under the pretext of safeguarding national security pursuant to sez. 232 Trade Expansion Act 1962, the U.S. eluded the WTO procedure for the adoption of trade-restrictive measures and did not allow the WTO to assess the adequacy of the trade measures imposed (Belladonna A., Gili A., ISPI Online, Fact Checking: i dazi di Trump).
According to this procedure, if there is a risk of harm from another member State, it is necessary to first engage in friendly consultations, and only at a later stage (after the lack of implementation of the panel’s or Appelate body’s recommendations and rulings) would it be possible to request authorization to use restrictive trade measures, as set forth in art. 22, Annex 2 of Marrakesh Agreement. In this sense, the repeated violations and unilateral initiatives launched during Trump’s second presidency have quickly contributed to what is now considered the “worst crisis that the WTO has experienced” (CEPR, Why the US and the WTO should part ways).
In May 2025, the European Commission announced its intention to file a request for consultations at the WTO, arguing that U.S. tariffs represent a serious violation of the fundamental rules of the WTO. Additionally, also in May 2025, the Commission itself drafted a list of counter tariffs to respond to the White House’s aggressive trade policy. This list includes duties on typical American export products, from meats to Alaskan cod, as well as on SUVs, pickup trucks, and aircraft (Rai News, La Ue annuncia ricorso al Wto contro i dazi reciproci di Trump).
To prevent the imposition of the duties of the maxi-list, and thus to avoid the risk of a transatlantic trade war, an agreement was reached between President Trump and European Commission President Ursula Von Der Leyen last July 27. The deal established that the U.S. tariffs will remain at 15% for the majority of imported products starting from August 7 of this year (Financial Times, US and EU reach tariff agreement to avert trade war).
This measure applies to goods currently taxed below 15%, while no changes will be made for products already subject to 15% tariffs. The action, as reiterated by the Commission, aims to protect sensitive sectors of European agriculture such as beef and poultry (Ruminantia, Trump rinvia i dazi al 7 agosto).
The European Union has therefore currently set aside the extreme measure of counter tariffs, but leaves open the possibility of resorting to them if the terms are not respected (Sky Tg24, Dazi Trump, Ue: 'Contro-tariffe sospese per sei mesi. Spetta a Usa attuare accordo).
However, although the European Union succeeded in safeguarding its commercial interests within certain limits, the situation seems to be critical for other countries. This is the case, for example, of Canada, whose tariffs have sharply increased from 25% to 35% (Ruminantia, Trump rinvia i dazi al 7 agosto).
In the US-EU trade relations, it is primarily the European agri-food sector that is paying the piper of the trade dispute. In particular, Made in Italy and its sectors of excellence, such as wine, cheese, olive oil, cold cuts and pasta, could suffer a devastating backlash (Ruminantia, Dazi USA: lo scontro commerciale travolge l’agroalimentare europeo).
On this matter, the Italian Minister of Agriculture, Food Sovereignty and Forests, Francesco Lollobrigida, expressed his concerns, too. During a video conference held with the presidents of the PDO and PGI consortia to discuss the potential risks posed by tariffs, he emphasized the need to protect geographical indications. These, in fact, are synonymous with quality and they contribute not only to the growth of the Italian economy, but also to safeguarding and promoting the identity of our country worldwide.
Although the Italian agri-food system is not currently facing a crisis, it is essential to act preventively by developing strategies that guarantee continuous collaboration between businesses and institutions, starting with the government itself, in order to protect the agri-food sector and allow entrepreneurs to continue operating in their role under optimal circumstances (Ruminantia, Convocato al Masaf il tavolo delle Indicazioni Geografiche).
The productive reality of Parma is also fearing serious consequences: with six major supply chains, among the most important in the Italian agri-food system, there are concerns about the impact on exports of the “4 Ps of excellence” (Gazzetta di Parma, Dazi, l'allarme delle associazioni degli agricoltori per gli effetti sulla Food Valley ): Parmigiano Reggiano PDO, Prosciutto di Parma PDO, pasta, and tomatoes.
Just consider that the Emilia-Romagna Food Valley alone accounts for 5% of all food exports in Italy. This is a true “PDO economy” (Fondazione Qualivita, Dazi: DOP e IGP nel mirino di Trump), in which the U.S. represents 21% of total exports. (Fondazione Qualivita, Dazi: DOP e IGP nel mirino di Trump).
In particular, Parmigiano Reggiano PDO exports have the U.S. as their primary market, with a value of 100 million euros. In fact, the American market currently represents the most attractive foreign market for the export of hard cheeses (Gazzetta di Parma, Dazi, l'allarme delle associazioni degli agricoltori per gli effetti sulla Food Valley ).
Also employees of the large number of companies in the region are carefully looking at Trump’s next decisions: it is estimated that for every 10% drop in exports to the U.S., approximately 5000 jobs could be lost across the entire agri-food supply chain. The solid export relationship between Italy and the U.S. for PDO and PGI products means that the imposition of tariffs could also harm the U.S. economy by causing increased costs throughout the supply chain and for end consumers. (Fondazione Qualivita, Dazi Usa, la Food Valley di Parma: "Prodotti DOP i più penalizzati" ).
Although the tariffs introduced by Trump are presented as a success for the American economy (La Voce, Sui dazi di Trump pesano due grandi equivoci), experts argue that their implementation would have negative consequences for overall employment, undermining market efficiency, even if they may generate modest gains in employment within the directly protected sectors (Galli G., Geraci N., Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Chi paga i dazi di Trump? Una rassegna della letteratura).
Besides, the ones who would suffer the impact first are American businesses and consumers: as a consequence of tariffs competition decreases, prices rise, and economic growth could potentially slow down (Monacelli T., La Voce, Sui dazi di Trump pesano due grandi equivoci).
In view of the above, it becomes clear that tariff increases are less of a victory and more of a hidden tax imposed on American businesses and citizens who, often unknowingly, bear the direct and indirect consequences in terms of reduced consumer choice. Thus, it would be less of an economic victory and more of a political and ideological one, as an attempt to fix public deficits and a more and more vulnerable economy (Monacelli T., La Voce, Sui dazi di Trump pesano due grandi equivoci).
On the other hand, at the end of the day, while the U.S. does not seem to be gaining significant benefits from the imposition of tariffs, it is certain that any U.S. action against the EU would inevitably have a negative impact on our imports (Belladonna A., Gili A., ISPI Online, Fact Checking: i dazi di Trump).
To mitigate such risks, Minister Lollobrigida suggests that a possible strategy to reduce the economic impact of tariffs on the Italian economy would be to enhance the promotion of high-quality products, push toward new markets, and strengthen the partnership between institutions and private entities. These are key actions to address this challenge and safeguard Made in Italy, ensuring security and stability for the entire sector’s supply chains (Ministero dell’agricoltura, della sovranità alimentare e delle foreste, Convocato tavolo delle IG. Lollobrigida: lavorare su promozione e nuovi mercati esteri).